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1.  Introduction 
 
The developing economies of the world are still drowning in debt, see Geneva Report, by Buttiglione, 
et al. (2014).  This is especially so in the case of housing finance (Mian and Sufi, 2014).  In this 
Chapter we aim to explain why this has happened, and to suggest how the process of financial 
intermediation might be reformed to shift such financing more towards equity and away from debt 
finance, especially in housing.  In the course of this exercise we shall focus first on the weakness of 
labour, as a factor of production, as being a fundamental cause of both recent trends in the 
economy, i.e. the deficiency of demand and the arrival of deflationary pressures, and also of the, 
sometimes unavailing, policy effort to counter this by ever more accommodating monetary policy.  
This has led, since the onset of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), to a mutually inconsistent set of 
policies, with ever tighter regulations on banks, causing massive deleveraging (especially in cross-
border lending), offsetting unprecedented and unconventional expansionary measures by Central 
Banks.  The result has been a huge expansion of commercial bank deposits at the Central Bank, a 
blow-out of the bank reserve (R) to deposit ratio (D), R/D, with the banks caught in a liquidity trap, 
whereby holding such reserves at the Central Bank is currently as attractive as any other usage of 
such funds.  We shall end by suggesting how this trap might be sprung. 
 
But, first, we have to go back to the beginning of our story, which concerns the effects and 
implications of the weakness of labour, relative to capital, as a factor or production.  There has been 
a long-term downwards trend in the share and strength of labour in national income, which is 
depressing both demand and inflation: This has prompted ever more expansionary monetary 
policies. While understandable, indeed appropriate, within a short-term business cycle context, this 
has exacerbated longer-term trends, increasing inequality and financial distortions. Perhaps the 
most fundamental problem has been over-reliance on debt finance (leverage).  
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The recent BIS Annual Report (84th, Basel, June 29), claimed on page 7 that “Understanding the 
current global economic challenges requires a long-term perspective”, if we hope to find a ‘new 
compass’ for setting macroeconomic policies. This Chapter aims to provide such a perspective by 
focusing initially upon one particular trend in developed countries, which is this trend decline in the 
adjusted wage share as a percentage of GDP in most developed countries since the end of the 
1970s. This is shown for four main economies in Figure 1, and for a wider set of countries in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Adjusted Wage Share Declining Across DM 
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Figure 2 
DM Adjusted Wage Shares (as % of GDP) 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015F 
Germany 61.1 63.7 58.8 60.6 57.1 57.9 
France  63 66.5 59.3 57.2 58.7 58.2 
Italy 65.4 66.6 61.9 53.2 55.4 55.1 
Spain 64.2 66.8 61.7 58.9 56.8 52.3 
Canada  61 59.3 59.7 56.4 57.4 56.7 
Australia 59.8 63.6 59.1 57.1 53.7 56.3 
Denmark 60.2 62.3 59.3 56.4 59.5 57.7 
Ireland 67.3 70 59.4 48.3 53.2 50.1 
Greece 64.8 60.3 62.4 55.6 55 47.1 
Norway 58.3 55.2 54 46.6 48.1 49.6 
Netherlands 65.2 68.1 61.7 59.6 59.4 60.2 
Source: European Commission AMECO database, Morgan Stanley Research 
   
 
 
 
While the rate of decline varies from country to country, it nevertheless appears to be broadly 
common. This has reflected an initial fall and flattening in the rate of growth of real compensation 
per employee since the early 1980s, which has been continuing through the ups and downs of the 
economic cycle, and is again common to most developed countries; it cannot easily be attributed to 
short-term political or macroeconomic policies. This is shown for a variety of countries in Figure 3, 
and for a wider set of countries in Figure 4.  
 
It is not our purpose here to try to explain why this has been happening; it is far too complex for us 
to tackle. Nevertheless, our preferred explanation is globalisation, and in particular the entry of the 
Asian, especially Chinese, (and also those Eastern European countries formerly part of the 
communist system) labour force into the world’s trading economy. This has allowed businessmen to 
apply a credible threat of relocating the production of any good, and of most services, to anywhere 
else in the world, where labour costs are considerably cheaper. This has gone hand in hand with a 
decline in private sector unionisation almost everywhere, with causation going in both directions, 
and with a simultaneous decline in inequality between countries at a time when inequality within 
countries has been rising.  
 
It is certainly possible that technical progress, in the shape for example of IT and robotics, has 
further weakened the share in output of labour, relative to capital and land (including natural 
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resources, such as oil), but the measurement of this effect is fraught with difficulties. What we tend 
not to believe is that there is some immutable law whereby the return to capital must outstrip the 
overall growth rate of the country (r > g), as proposed by T. Piketty in Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century. 
 
2. The Macroeconomic Consequences of a Fall in the Wage Share 
 
Be that as it may, what we do want to focus upon are the macroeconomic consequences of a trend 
decline in the wage share of GDP, and relatively low real wage growth, relative to returns to capital 
and land. Workers tend to be poorer, more liquidity-constrained and less likely to aim (or be able) to 
pass on wealth in inheritance to subsequent generations than the owners of capital and land. Hence 
they will, as a generality, have a higher (marginal) propensity to consume. So, the trend weakness in 
returns to labour will simultaneously tend to hold down consumption, output and inflation (see, for 
example, the paper by Kumhof et al. (2013). 
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Figure 3 
Real Compensation Growth Weak Across DM 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Real Compensation per Employee (avg. annual %) 
  1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 2000-10 2010-15 
Germany 3.4% 0.5% 1.8% 0.6% 0.2% 
France  4.2% 0.8% 1.2% 0.9% 0.5% 
Italy 3.6% 1.2% 0.2% 0.7% -0.1% 
Spain 5.7% 1.3% 0.5% 0.6% 0.2% 
Canada  0.8% 1.1% 1.2% 0.6% 0.7% 
Australia 2.2% 0.4% 1.8% 0.1% 2.8% 
Denmark 2.2% 0.4% 1.8% 0.1% 2.8% 
Ireland 5.0% 2.3% 1.6% 2.6% -0.8% 
Greece 3.6% 0.0% 0.6% 0.9% -2.8% 
Norway 2.6% 1.9% 1.0% 0.7% 1.1% 
Netherlands 3.2% 0.5% 1.2% 1.3% 0.7% 
Source: European Commission AMECO database, Morgan Stanley Research 
  
 
 
This weakness in consumption and output is likely to lead to some fiscal expansion and rebalancing, 
whereby welfare and benefits rise, financed by higher taxes on the rich. Whether there is scope for 
further fiscal expansion, in view of heightened public sector debt ratios and prospective future 
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claims on the public purse from an ageing population, and for a more aggressive rebalancing and 
fiscal redistribution, is yet another major topic that is too large and complex to be tackled here. 
 
What we do instead note is that circumstances in which both real output and inflation are held down 
compared to target by the relative weakness of labour would seem, superficially, tailor-made to be 
rectified by expansionary monetary policy. Just as the share of labour has been declining since the 
1980s, so has the level of real interest rates. This coincidence of a declining wage share and declining 
real interest rates is not, we believe, accidental.  
 
From a short-term, business cycle viewpoint, a conjuncture of sluggish output growth and low 
inflation, surprising on the downside, should be met with and rectified by more expansionary 
monetary policy. But if one accepts the hypothesis that a (perhaps the) longer-term driver of such a 
conjuncture is the relative weakness of labour as a factor of production, then this short-term 
response is unhelpful, indeed somewhat counterproductive, in a longer-term context. Its main effect 
is to raise asset prices, and the relative value of land and capital, and thus benefit their owners, who 
are rich, rather than workers, who are poor. Hence, the trickle-down effect via the added 
consumption of the beneficiaries will be muted. More private sector capex would most likely benefit 
workers, e.g., by raising productivity and shifting the K/L ratio, but, alas, the empirical evidence 
shows capex to be notably interest-insensitive. Meanwhile, public sector investment is constrained 
by a variety of other factors, much to the dismay of Keynesians. What we are left with is the impact 
of monetary policy, whether conventional or unconventional, on housing and exchange rates. 
Movements in the latter are a zero-sum game globally; my depreciation is your appreciation. 
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Figure 5 
Real Interest Rates Negative Across DM 
 
 
 
This leaves housing. The financing of residential and commercial property has become central to our 
banking systems in recent decades, whether directly via mortgages, or indirectly via loans to 
construction companies, loans collateralised on property, etc. And almost all such financing is done 
in debt form. The failure to reform housing financing modalities in the aftermath of the Great 
Financial Crisis has been a missed opportunity, indeed a tragedy.  
 
The decline in (long-term) real interest rates has been a major factor leading to a rise in housing and 
property prices, relative to labour incomes. It has, of course, benefitted those already on the housing 
ladder, the old and the rich. So, affordability has been on a trend decline, though less in the US than 
elsewhere.  
 
Against this background, the bipartisan political incentive prior to 2008 in the US to encourage more 
mortgage lending to the poorer, disadvantaged classes was entirely understandable. But it ended in 
the sub-prime crisis. Insofar as the main domestic transmission route of monetary policy to the real 
economy lies in the housing market, the authorities would appear to be caught in a dilemma. Either 
they encourage the young, the workers and the poor to take on an unstable and excessive burden of 
debt, or they pump up all other asset prices further and further for less and less effect on the real 
economy, with a potentially growing risk of some future (disorderly?) reversal.  
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The current mantra is to constrain any incipient overheating and excess indebtedness in the housing 
market by macro-prudential measures (e.g., the UK and Sweden), while pressing on with 
expansionary monetary policies to regain output-inflation targets. This raises several queries. First, 
will the macro-prudential measures be pressed aggressively enough to work? But if they do, and the 
housing transmission channel is blocked, may not the resulting effects on other asset prices, 
including the exchange rate, have to be even more extreme (relative to labour incomes) and hence 
more distortionary and cause yet greater inequality?  
 
There is, therefore, a longer-term, structural problem with monetary policy: As the BIS Annual 
Report (op cit) noted on page 18:  
“Policy does not lean against the booms but eases aggressively and persistently during busts. This 
induces a downward bias in interest rates and an upward bias in debt levels, which in turn makes it 
hard to raise rates without damaging the economy – a debt trap. Systemic financial crises do not 
become less frequent or intense, private and public debts continue to grow, the economy fails to 
climb onto a stronger sustainable path, and monetary and fiscal policies run out of ammunition. 
Over time, policies lose their effectiveness and may end up fostering the very conditions they seek to 
prevent. In this context, economists speak of ‘time inconsistency’: taken in isolation, policy steps 
may look compelling but, as a sequence, they lead policymakers astray.” 
 
Whether this is true, yet, also for fiscal policy is a contentious issue, which we shall duck. Let us just 
state that policies of consciously allowing public sector debt ratios to rise further now are unlikely to 
prove acceptable in most countries. Having thus argued that expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies have both largely ‘shot their bolt’, the BIS argues instead for “balance sheet repair and 
structural reforms”. Alas, we believe that its positive proposals are much less compelling than its 
criticisms of existing policies.  
 
Whereas structural reforms and deleveraging are beneficial in the longer term, almost by definition, 
they are much easier to achieve during periods of fast growth, rather than the current sluggish 
expansion. Moreover, structural reform commonly involves removing the monopolistic rents of 
protected sectors, and thus initially is deflationary, prior to the subsequent expansion of output and 
productivity. The longer the stagnation, the more difficult it may be politically to introduce supply-
side reforms, such as cutting subsidies. Absent specifics, and there are virtually none in the BIS 
Annual Report, a call for more structural reform and delevering is akin to an appeal to a deus ex 
machina.  
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3. Improving the Form of Housing Finance 
 
A better proposal is to be found in the book by Mian and Sufi, House of Debt, especially Chapter 12. 
The GFC primarily impacted the poor, especially those subject to foreclosure, whereas the 
countervailing expansionary monetary policy mainly benefitted the rich, thereby worsening the 
longer-term trends already reported earlier in this note.  
 
Their solution is for financial intermediaries to offer  
“[A] shared-responsibility mortgage (SRM) [which] has two important differences: (1) the lender 
offers downside protection to the borrower, and (2) the borrower gives up [a part of his/her] capital 
gain to the lender on the upside… “(P.192).  
 
If housing price movements were independently and identically distributed, this would be a perfect 
solution. Unfortunately, they are not; they are strongly auto-correlated, with long periods of rising 
prices, sometimes culminating in a frenzy of sharp increases, interspersed with shorter periods of 
collapses in such prices. 
 
Figure 6 
Housing (Un-)Affordability Driven by post-2000 Surge in House Prices 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The way that this would work is shown in the box below, which is mainly taken from Mian and Sufi 
(2014, p. 171-3). 
 
 
How the SRM Works  
The key difference between the SRM and typical mortgage is that the SRM provides downside 
protection to the owner if house prices fall. The owner’s mortgage-payment schedule is linked to 
some form of local house price index: “For example, if her local house-price index is 100 when she 
buys the home, and falls by 30 percent by the end of her first year of ownership, [the owner’s] 
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mortgage payment in her second year would decline 30 percent (...) Her amortization schedule 
would remain the same. As a result, even though she will make a lower payment, her mortgage 
balance goes down according to the original formula. This in effect means that [the owner] is given 
an automatic principal reduction when house prices in her area fall below her purchasing level. In 
our specific example, if [the owner’s] house-price index remains at 70 for the remaining twenty-nine 
years of her mortgage, she will have received a 30 percent forgiveness in principal by the end of her 
thirty years” (P. 172-173). However, on average, house prices are expected to grow. At some point 
house prices will again likely exceed the original purchase price. Increasing gradually, once the house 
price index reaches that original level, the owner will be making full payments again.  
The downside protection comes at the expense of the lender, who would therefore charge a fee. To 
eliminate that, Mian and Sufi suggest: “giving the lender a small share in the upside as well. In 
particular, an SRM should also provide the lender with a 5 percent share of the capital gain 
whenever [the owner] sells or refinances her house. The 5 percent capital-gain rule is a small charge 
for [the owner], especially considering that capital gains on owner-occupied housing are otherwise 
tax-free”. (P. 173-174) 
 
During the upswing, and even perhaps especially in the final frenzy, home buyers may not be keen to 
share prospective capital gains with lenders, despite the self-insurance advantage. Some tentative 
attempts to introduce shared-equity mortgages in the UK apparently ran into consumer resistance 
during the long periods of rising house prices. Some complained that they had not understood the 
terms of the contract and had been mis-sold. 
 
Perhaps more seriously, would a lender be prepared to offer downside price protection, once the 
market had begun to crack? At what rate would lenders have offered such protection in, say, Las 
Vegas in 2008? Given the pattern of auto-correlation on housing prices, we fear that too few 
mortgage buyers would seek such SRMs in upswings, and that no sellers would offer it, or not at 
feasible rates, during downswings.  
 
Nevertheless we think that the idea of greater (self) insurance via a larger equity element in the 
housing market is good. This was a key feature of the Help to Buy equity loan, which has now been 
extended to 2020. It should be possible to build on this. For example, the government could decree 
that all house purchases had to have at least, say, a 30% equity share, of which a minimum of 5% 
would have to belong to the purchasers, though both such numbers are, at this point, somewhat 
arbitrary and would need much more careful analysis in any practical application. Insofar as 
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purchasers were unable to reach the 30% level themselves, they could either purchase an SRM in 
the market, or go to the government for equity funding. Of course, during downturns, the 
authorities would then be landed with almost all such housing finance, but: i) This would be strongly 
counter-cyclical; ii) It would be politically (more) popular (than bank bail-out); and iii) Given all that 
we know about the housing market, it should be long-term profitable for taxpayers. The media has, 
in general, been critical of the UK government’s Help to Buy equity loan scheme, but supportive of 
aggressively expansionary monetary policy. We reverse the argument: Help to Buy is part of the 
solution to a long-term structural problem which has been, in part, exacerbated by aggressively 
expansionary monetary policies.  
 
However, the more fundamental problem is not those policies, but the financing context in which 
they operate, which gives advantages to debt over equity financing. The most egregious is the 
relative tax advantage of debt finance, and the ‘Holy Grail’ would be to equalise, or even shift, such 
advantages to the benefit of equity finance. Moreover, in a world with massive existing debt 
overhang, the transition to a much higher equity ratio can be very painful to existing shareholders, 
usually including top management, who are in a position to block any such move.  
 
Among such changes to a more equity-financed world could be a change in the pattern of 
government finance: Thus, a move towards nominal income bonds should help to make government 
finance less pro-cyclical, with less austerity during deflation and less temptation for Ministers of 
Finance to raid surpluses during booms. Of course, there are problems of revisions, and even 
falsification, to data, but these could be handled. 
 
4. Reforming the Structure of Financial Intermediation 
 
It is not only the form of housing finance that needs reform, but also the structure of financial 
intermediation through which such finance is provided.  As Jordà, Schularick and Taylor have 
demonstrated, (2014/15), it is the rapid growth of lending on real estate, both on housing and on 
commercial property, that has led bank loans to expand much faster than bank deposits in recent 
decades, since the 1970s.  That funding gap was filled, until 2009, by increasing reliance on 
wholesale funding, mostly short-term, uninsured and provided by informed and flighty investors, 
(see Schularick and Taylor, 2009).  As Adair Turner has noted (2013), banks changed from providing 
(short-term) finance for business to making much longer term (mortgage) loans to households.  This 
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led to enhanced maturity mismatch and excessive leverage, and took banking away from its 
traditional role and functions. 
 
So long as housing prices remained strong, the system was stable, since the property was by itself 
good collateral for the original loan; similarly all financial markets that were derivative of the 
housing market, such as CMOs, remained liquid and accessible.  But once the housing market should 
begin to weaken, the system became fragile, though the extent of fragility depended on a variety of 
other factors, such as whether the mortgage loans were made on a recourse, or non-recourse, basis, 
the initial loan to value (LTV) or loan to income (LTI) ratio, the ease of foreclosure by the lender, etc., 
etc.  That fragility was evidenced by the frequency whereby financial crises were triggered by 
collapses in property markets in recent decades; in the UK all three recent crises, 1973-75, 1990-92 
and 2007-9, were triggered in this manner.  Moreover, the demise of Lehman Bros was caused by 
unwise investment in a portfolio of housing and property related securities, not by its derivative 
book. 
 
For reasons that remain unclear, the main subsequent attack on the banking industry has been 
focussed on the role and functions of investment banking, which, though undoubtedly culpable in 
several respects, was not primarily responsible for the GFC, while ignoring the role of banking in the 
provision of property finance which was at the centre of the crisis.  Indeed, the separation of 
universal banks, as proposed by Vickers, into separate investment and retail banking subsidiaries will 
likely aggravate the tendency for the latter to concentrate on mortgage and property finance.   
 
The  need, instead, is to reverse the collapse of the housing finance specialist intermediaries, S&Ls in 
the USA, Building Societies in the UK, into the arms of the banks.  All housing, commercial real 
estate, and property related lending (with a residual life to maturity greater than, say, one year) 
should be done by specialist property finance companies, who should not be allowed to offer 
transactions accounts, or short-term deposit liabilities.  There should be a much greater equity 
element in such mortgage loans (the Mian and Sufi SRMs) balanced by an equally large, or larger, 
equity ratio in the property finance houses.  Such houses would be encouraged to securitise their 
fixed interest book, preferably in the form of Danish-style covered bonds, but banks would be 
forbidden to hold such securities unless they had a remaining life of under one year.  The aim would 
be to take banking back to its traditional verities, and to revise a refashioned ‘real bills’ doctrine, 
whereby banks deploy their short-term deposit funding to lend on a short-term, self-liquidating 
basis, or to hold assets that would remain liquid in a crisis. 
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The shortage of equity, prior to 2008, was, perhaps, most egregious in those banks taking a punt on 
the property market, e.g. Anglo-Irish, Northern Rock, RBS, etc., but leverage was excessive 
throughout the banking sector.  The calls for much higher equity ratios, e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 
(2013); Miles, et al, (2013), are correct in principle.  But the problem is how to get there.  With bank 
CEOs committed to try to reach some desired level for their banks’ Return on Equity (RoE), a weak 
market for bank equity and a massive existing debt overhang, the incentive for bank management is 
to meet tougher capital adequacy requirements by deleveraging.  With governments all imploring 
‘their own banks’ to maintain domestic lending, such deleveraging has had an especially severe 
effect on cross-border lending. 
 
The results have not been pretty, with the macro-economic effects of tougher regulation 
counteracting the expansionary force of unconventional expansionary monetary policy, and leading 
to the enormous pile-up of commercial bank deposits at the Central Bank.  There are several 
possible routes to ease this conflict of objectives.  One such route would be to try to adjust the 
incentive structure of management, perhaps along the lines suggested in Goodhart (2014).  Another 
would be to force banks with insufficient equity capital to accept injections of public sector equity, 
but on terms expected to be highly profitable for the taxpayer and costly for the existing private 
sector shareholders.  Whereas this was successfully done in the USA with TARP (Troubled Asset 
Recovery Program) and the 2009 (CCAP) stress tests, it was, mistakenly, ruled out elsewhere by the, 
wildly exaggerated, hue and cry about the evils of bail-out. 
 
So within Europe little has been done to mitigate the restrictive effect of much tougher bank 
regulation.  This has played a role in Europe’s continuing stagnation, though the scale of such effect 
is almost impossible to measure, and highly contentious.  Opinions vary widely. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
There has been a long-term downwards trend in the share and strength of labour in national 
income, depressing both demand and inflation. This has prompted ever more expansionary 
monetary policies. While understandable, indeed appropriate, within a short-term business cycle 
context, this has exacerbated longer-term trends, increasing inequality and financial distortions. 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem has been over-reliance on debt finance (leverage). We 
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propose measures, involving government intervention, to raise the share of equity finance in 
housing markets; such reforms could be extended to other sectors of the economy.  Similarly we 
propose shifting the provision of housing finance from banks back to specialist property finance 
companies.  These, like banks and other financial intermediaries, should hold a much higher equity 
ratio than heretofore.  The problem is how to reach that goal without instigating massive 
deleveraging, a problem which has not so far been solved in Europe.   
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